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Finance Capitalism’s Perpetually Extinguished Pasts:
Exploring Discursive Shifts 2007-2011

When we published the call for papers for this special issue in early 2010 we invited authors to submit work that somehow could elucidate the discursive shifts of and about finance capital in the broader context of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Over the period mid-2009 to mid-2011 we witnessed a transition from ubiquitous narratives about a dystopian collapse of our socio-economic system to pervasive claims that what we had lived through was simply a temporarily blip in a self-correcting free market system which needed little more than perfecting what was already there. In this new discourse finance capital was rehabilitated and the state systems which actually rescued the financial system became the main target of critique. A combination of emergency liquidity supplies to financial institutions (in a significant number of high profile cases involving recapitalisation by the state) and a quick dose of Keynesian public spending had come at great cost to the public purse and was followed by an official strategy of deficit-cutting austerity. This strategy was further framed in terms of a ‘taking advantage of the crisis’ discourse, advocating structural reforms in social provision and pensions.  Morgan et al. (2011, 148) seemed to capture a mood of exasperation amongst critical scholars when they exclaimed: “How did we get from the politics of the financial crash, from the ‘end of the world’ rhetoric of late 2008 to this”? But, by and large, this discourse of returning to ‘business as usual’ as quickly as possible was hardly questioned despite the fact that few of its associated measures have shown any sign of working. Financial markets again have been “raised to the status of omniscient and implacable forces of inevitable (and ultimately benign and produc​tive) economic logics” (ibid.)  whilst our collective dependence upon the banks is now greater than ever (a dependence nicely captured by the motto “too big to fail”) and the political influence of the financial sector seems undiminished​[1]​ (Willmott 2011). The period 2007-2011thus seems to bear out a Marxist reading of Capital as a “machine constantly breaking down, repairing itself not by solving its local problems but by mutation onto larger and larger scales, its past always punctually forgotten...” (Jameson 2011, 7). Of course, as Prichard and Mir (2010, 508) pointed out, it is precisely this forgetfulness, a “collective absent mindedness” that lies at the very core of the economic regime that creates the conditions for ever more frequent and intensive crises. Fredric Jameson’s (2011, 106) description of our current historical moment as “the eternal virginity of capitalism and its perpetually extinguished pasts” seems particularly apposite in this context. 

Given the significance of the developments of the last few years it is somewhat surprising that our field has devoted so little attention to the GFC and its aftermath. For example, Prichard and Mir (2010, 509) documented how “key gatherings of the critically-inclined management and organization studies community” failed to pay much attention to “the major economic events of the day and the changing character of organized economic relations” during 2008 and 2009. Morgan et al. (2011) made much the same observation a year later, adding that all the top ranking journals in the field (US as well as European) had kept studiously clear of the financial crisis, whilst expressing some disappointment at the limited number of submissions to their own special issue on Capitalism in Crisis.  This is despite the fact that critical management studies had aligned itself with a strong tradition of critical research in the social sciences that had focused precisely upon “the big issues and problems which people face in their lives in order to arrive at an understanding of the present which can illuminate possibilities for a better future and inform struggles to achieve it” (Fairclough 2006, 112). This limited attention by organizational scholars seems symptomatic of a wider societal particularity associated with the GFC. In situations of crisis one normally finds a proliferation of discourses imagining alternative forms of organization for economy and society, thus potentially offering a fruitful terrain for anyone interested in discourse analysis. And yet, what we witnessed over the last few years was a systematic shutting down of alternative discourses. For elites in academia, politics and the business world certain (troubling) characteristics about the financial market architecture had simply become ‘necessary’ facts and any deviation from this doxa had become dangerous as it would put a putative recovery at risk. Schneiberg and Bartley (2010, 282) listed some key features about the financial market architecture that have become accepted as inevitable and possibly even desirable: its global character; the integration of finance across different sectors; securitization; and a reliance on private, for profit provision. Jessop (2009, 351) pithily summarized the situation at the end of 2009: “The dominant forces in the leading capitalist economies managed to normalize the situation, individuals have accepted the crisis as a fact of life and turned to coping strategies... and there is a return to capitalist normality”.  

To this day public debate surrounding the GFC seems to be conducted within the terms of an unconscious problematic which silently underpins it. Such a particular organization of categories which at any given historical moment constitutes the limits of what we are able to utter and conceive is of course a clear indication of ideology at work (Eagleton 1991). In Gramscian terms we can talk of a hegemonic ideology, an ideology which has achieved a measure of consent or at least acquiescence across social groups and social fields and international boundaries (Fairclough 2006). A hegemonic ideology does not so much combat alternative ideas as thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable. As Eagleton (1991, 58) suggested, “Ideologies exist because there are things which must at all costs not be thought, let alone spoken”. We just feel that there is something we ought to be thinking, but we have no idea what it is. The central task of criticism in such a situation is to keep alive the possibility of praxis by ‘making the present thinkable’. This is particularly pertinent now (autumn 2011) we may be sliding once again from ‘capitalist normality’ into another ‘end of the world’ episode. It is to this cause of ‘making the present thinkable’ that this special issue intends to make a contribution by joining empirical and conceptual dots in a slightly different way from the one we have been accustomed to. Roberts and Ng offer perhaps the most radical attempt at joining conceptual dots as they try to disrupt a foundational belief of neo-classical economics. Through the work of Lacan and Callon they challenge hegemonic perceptions of what they call the “fiction of the rational individual”. Bryan’s short position piece is a call for new ways of thinking about the social role of finance. Using the rugby analogy of ‘going forward’ he maps the advance, even post-GFC, of the financial juggernaut, both in term of its reach and volume. Bourne and Edwards examine a key, but until recently underexplored, financial actor: the hedge fund industry. They analyse how the hedge fund industry body (AIMA) tried to produce trust in the industry and its institutions through discursive and material interventions. The key date source they use here are the press releases covering the period 2007-2010 which were part of a wider public relations effort in the context of the GFC and its aftermath. MacKenna and Rooney use computer assisted text analysis to reveal the unreal (or irrealis) aspects of financial discourse over the period 2007-2009 and make the reader aware of the dangers when financial beliefs become institutionalised as economic truths.  Whilst MacKenna and Rooney survey the Anglo-Saxon press (mainly articles published in the Financial Times), Hartz turns to a key liberal newspaper in Germany, the Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung. He explores the role semiosis plays in overcoming the crisis in neo-liberal discourse and hence stabilizing capitalist social formations in Germany.  The German-oriented focus is continued at a micro-level by Svetlova who examines how discourses about the GFC were constructed in various Swiss and German banks. She uses Goffman’s theatrical metaphor of front and backstage to focus on the interactive and situational elements of the forecasting process in these banks. Front stage predictions of the future are rigid, number-oriented and artificially precise whilst backstage the organization of forecasting is much looser and less formal without having much influence on front stage performance. Thus, in their own particular way, the authors of the six papers included in this special issue render visible some of the abstract and intangible dimensions of the financial force-field that continue to shape our socio-economic life.
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^1	  To provide just one recent example: modest proposals to reform the UK banking system and reduce the inherent risks it poses to the public purse were described as “barking mad” at a “moment of growth peril” by the director-general of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in a Financial Times article published in August 2011. This is in the context of Barclays’ chief executive publicly stating in April 2011 that the bank need to “increase its risk appetite” in order to hit profitability targets (as reported in the Financial Times, April 4th 2011). It now seems that the implementation of the proposals will be postponed until after the next general election in 2015. 
